Using a set of proprietary records, we examine who consumes quarterly earnings conference calls. We find significant interest in earnings conference calls beyond investors and sell-side analysts and demand varies in predictable ways according to the objectives of these users. Institutional investors who do not hold a position in the firm are the primary consumers of calls and many institutional investors that hold large positions only consume news periodically. We find that most of the variation in consumption is driven by firm related factors that are not readily influenced by direct managerial decisions in the short-run. We find that some efforts to hide news by disclosing it late in the day or week are associated with lower immediate consumption. However, the more limited immediate consumption is offset by even greater consumption in the coming days, thereby thwarting efforts to avoid scrutiny. Overall, our investigation illuminates the actual usage of firm news by different consumers.
Introduction
Whether reviewing a press release, preparing for a conference call, or speaking at an industry conference, executives spend a considerable amount of time and effort on the public disclosure of firm news. Some of this disclosure is mandated by regulation, but much of it is voluntary. Managers expend this effort on voluntary disclosure because of the perceived benefits of providing greater transparency to the market (e.g., improved liquidity, lower cost of capital.) 1 Researchers who study the effects of disclosure implicitly assume that once news is publicly disclosed, it is consumed by market participants. However, academic research says little about the specific market participants that actually seek out and consume these disclosures. The lack of evidence around who scrutinizes these disclosures arises from the nature of information consumption. In most cases, investors, analysts, and other market participants digest news in private (e.g. reading on a monitor, listening over a phone, watching on television, etc.).
Consequently, it is difficult to interpret exactly who is processing this information.
In this paper, we seek to illuminate the consumption of firm news by examining a proprietary set of records collected by Thomson Reuters, a multinational media firm and leading market data aggregator. Beginning in 2009, Thomson Reuters began to monitor and record when institutional clients listened to broadcasts or downloaded transcripts of conference calls. Using these records, we ascertain the specific types of individuals who sought information, which conference calls they looked for, when they sought to acquire the information, and for what firms.
By detailing the information consumption choices of institutional investors, analysts, and other business users, these records offer a unique opportunity to investigate the demand for one form of firm-initiated disclosure.
Our analysis of these records offers several insights into the consumption of firm disclosures. Beyond the significant demand for earnings conference calls by institutional investors and sell-side analysts, we show significant demand for earnings conference calls by individuals who are neither market participants, nor intermediaries that provide information to investors. These other constituencies include suppliers, strategic partners, bankers, consultants and media. This broader interest in firm-initiated news suggests a more expansive use of firm disclosures beyond simply reducing information asymmetries between managers and investors.
Among institutional investors that consume earnings conference calls, demand primarily arises from investors who are not contemporaneous holders in the firm's securities. Much of the academic research on firm disclosure focuses on the monitoring and contracting roles that arise between firm and investors. However, our findings suggest that investors who do not have such a relationship with the firm are actually the largest consumers of news. This suggests a more nuanced picture of consumers for whom this information is being produced for. To the extent that managers are aware of this broader constituency of consumers, it also suggests a more complex production function when creating disclosures. Overall, the significant consumption of firm news by investors who do not hold positions support the significant role played by disclosure in building investor recognition (Merton 1987 ).
In addition, institutional investors are often not regular consumers of earnings conference calls for the firms in which they have invested. Notably, we find that institutional investors, some of whom hold hundreds of millions of dollars in stock, only periodically consume the call. We find that particular types of investors, like hedge funds, and those holding relatively larger positions in the firm are considerably more engaged. However, the irregularity of consumption suggests that institutional investors do not necessarily monitor all news being produced by firms, but rather consume it selectively and in a periodic fashion.
We examine factors that influence consumption of earnings conference calls by the different constituencies. We explore factors at the firm level (e.g. market value, leverage), event level (e.g. negative surprise), and under the immediate discretion of management (e.g. time of call). We find that the vast majority of the variation in demand is driven by firm level factors suggesting that managers have, at least in the short run, only limited ability to influence the amount of consumption.
Researchers often focus on the timeliness of firm-initiated disclosures. However, we find considerable demand for earnings conference call events in the months and even years after the initial disclosure event. This suggests that the demand for voluntary disclosure not only arises from the desire for timely updates about a firm's performance, but also from an interest in understanding a firm's past. Notably, less than half of the historical demand is from investors.
Sell-side analysts and corporate users (e.g. suppliers, competitors, bankers) are also significant consumers of historical earnings conference call disclosures. This finding complements recent work by Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock (2015) on how investors digest historical financial reports using the EDGAR database.
Prior academic research has hypothesized that managers may strategically release news to influence the amount of attention it receives. For instance, managers with bad news may seek to disclose it late Friday evening when market participants are less attentive in hopes that it will not be digested as critically. Using our records, we explore the effectiveness of hosting calls at less popular times, specifically after hours and Fridays. We find that firms who host calls after hours or Fridays do receive lower consumption at the time of its disclosure. However, this reduced consumption is offset by greater consumption of the archival call in subsequent days.
Consequently, it appears that managerial strategies to "hide" news may not be especially effective when this information can be consumed by users more conveniently in the following days.
Although our records from Thomson include a variety of different types of conference events for firms headquartered around the globe, we focus on earnings conference calls for NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms in order to facilitate comparison of our analysis with the broader literature on disclosure and earnings conference calls. Within this set of events, our analysis contains data for nearly 42,000 unique Thomson Reuters clients who make over 2.5 million requests for audio or transcript records during our sample period from late 2009 to the end of 2012. The sample of firms for which we have data about earnings conference call consumption represents nearly 55% of all US-based firms with publicly listed equity securities on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ.
Our investigation contributes to several sets of academic literature. First, our analysis facilitates a more expansive understanding of the demand for firm-initiated disclosure. Our analysis suggests that the buy-side constitutes approximately half of all demand for earnings conference call disclosures. Moreover, of this buy-side demand, less than half arises from investors who hold a position at the time of the call. Thus, the consumption of firm news is a much wider phenomenon than simply a transactional relationship between managers and existing investors. 2 In addition, our analysis offers evidence that disclosure is not simply a mechanism for the timely reduction in information asymmetry. There is considerable institutional demand for disclosure long after its initial release by different constituencies, which suggests that this information plays a broader role in understanding a firm's narrative. 3 We also contribute to an understanding of how and when institutional investors use firm disclosures. Because of the difficulty of observing the consumption of news by institutional investors, there is relatively little work describing how widely disclosures are consumed by holders and potential future holders (i.e. non-holders) of securities. The irregularity of consumption suggests that holders are not directly consuming all firm news about all their investments. Some investors are relatively passive when it comes to information consumption, suggesting that they may be relying on information intermediaries (e.g. sell-side analysts, media), only some disclosure types (e.g. 10-Q and not the earnings conference call), or only periodically checking in when certain events occur. In contrast, the widespread consumption of earnings conference calls by non-holders supports a desire for greater information.
Our investigation also contributes to the literature on earnings conference calls. 4 Researchers often implicitly assume that sell-side analysts are the primary group of individuals that consume earnings calls. This is due to the fact that sell-side analysts are typically the individuals that ask questions on calls. Other individuals that consume the call, but do not necessarily participate, are not known. However, a lack of participation does not necessarily imply a lack of consumption. Using our records, we are able to better understand and describe the different constituencies beyond sell-side analysts that consume earnings conference calls.
One caveat to our analysis is that users can consume earnings conference calls in ways that are not captured by Thomson Reuters. In particular, a user can contemporaneously consume the event by using a dial-in number, which is not run by Thomson Reuters. Alternatively, he can gain access to earnings conference call transcripts after the event via other channels that reproduce and disseminate transcripts (e.g. Bloomberg, FactSet, Seekingalpha.com, Yahoo! Finance). To the extent that certain constituencies utilize these alternative services rather than Thomson Reuters disproportionately, our analysis may understate the relative magnitude of usage by one group.
Finally, for managers this analysis should offer a better understanding of the determinants of earnings conference call consumption. Thomson Reuters originally collected this data to offer its investor relations clients a better way to understand who consumes their information releases.
However, there was little analysis done on the aggregate sample to understand the variation in demand. Our analysis begins to illuminate the factors associated with greater or lesser consumption of conference calls. In particular, our analysis shows that much of the variation is determined by firm characteristics that managers have little control of in the short run. Moreover, we find evidence suggesting that those firms which choose to make their audio broadcast available for a longer duration have greater news consumption. While broadening access seems an obvious way to increase demand, the fact that some firms who purportedly tout their transparency restrict access to their audio broadcast soon after the event suggests that either there are other considerations motivating this choice or that firms are myopically restricting access to their disclosures.
Institutional Background: Firm Disclosure and Earnings Conference Calls
Empirical research on disclosure typically follows efficient market assumptions in that once information is disclosed by firms, it is implicitly assumed to be immediately consumed by investors. 5 Firm news that is inaccessible or ignored by investors is unlikely to impart the same economic consequences as news that is more widely consumed by investors.
A growing body of recent research challenges this basic notion of informational efficiency by investigating how the differential dissemination of news influences its economic impact. For example, Engelberg and Parsons (2011) investigate the asset pricing consequences when investors are unable to consume timely firm news. By exploiting extreme weather events (e.g. blizzards, high precipitation, etc.), Engelberg and Parsons identify days in which specific subsets of investors are not able to receive their local paper and therefore cannot consume specific pieces of firm news. 6 Using this identification strategy, Engelberg and Parsons are able to causally identify an economically significant impact of news consumption on individual trading.
Even more recently, Blankespoor, Miller, and White (2014) offer evidence that firms who disseminate news via Twitter experience lower bid-ask spreads and greater depth. Their work complements other research on the role of the media in disseminating information to facilitate reductions in information asymmetries (Bushee et al. 2010 , Li, Ramesh, and Shen 2011 , Rogers et al. 2013 ). This body of evidence offers support that there are differential economic consequences associated with the availability and consumption of firm-initiated news.
In these investigations, researchers do not directly observe the consumption of news by investors. 7 The process of consuming news (e.g. reading a newspaper, listening on headphones) is private and therefore not generally observed or recorded. Thus, researchers implicitly assume that when news is more accessible (e.g. disseminated more widely by the media), it is consumed. Yet, there is little direct evidence showing who specifically consumes firm-initiated disclosures. 8 Earnings conference calls are one form of public firm disclosure where a subset of market participants that consume the news is known. Since the passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure in 2000, the public can listen to each question asked by participants (Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller 2004 , Mayew 2008 , Hollander, Pronk, and Roelofsen 2010 . In most cases, these participants are sell-side analysts. Mayew (2008) reports nearly eight sell-side analysts participate, on average, on each earnings conference call. While the names and brokerages of the analysts are publicly disclosed when they ask a question, they are not the only market participants listening to the call and seeking to consume this form of disclosure. Regulation Fair Disclosure was motivated, in 6 Engelberg and Parsons (2011) focus on a period in the early 1990's prior to the widespread availability of the internet when investors were much more likely to rely on the local newspaper for news. This allows them to observe consumption in conjunction with the level of dissemination. 8 In a different but related setting, there is evidence around the specific types of investors and analysts that consume private disclosure in the context of one-on-one meetings (Solomon and Soltes 2015, Soltes 2014). part, by the fact that other constituencies were interested in consuming these firm-initiated disclosures, but were denied access. 9 Yet, which other types of individuals and to what extent they seek to consume these disclosure events is not well understood.
Prior research offers some hypotheses about non-sell side consumers of earnings conference calls. Investors who provide equity or debt capital to firms have an interest in acquiring and monitoring news about firms. Empirical research has provided evidence that earnings conference calls offer incremental information to other sources of firm-initiated news (e.g. Frankel et al. 1999 , Bushee et al. 2003 , Brown et al. 2004 , Matsumoto et al. 2011 . In addition to specific information provided on the call, earnings conference calls also offer investors the opportunity to hear managers, thereby providing additional information through their vocal cues (Mayew and Venkatachalam 2012, Chen et al 2012) . Consequently, prior research has suggested that investors are significant consumers of earnings conference calls (Tasker 1998 , Bowen et al. 2002 , Kimbrough 2005 , Kimbrough and Louis 2011 While sell-side analysts are one significant information intermediary consuming earnings conference calls, another information intermediary is journalists who write for business media and seek to process, analyze, and disseminate news (Healy and Palepu 2001 , Miller 2006 , Bushee et al. 2010 ). Although they usually do not participate in the call as do sell-side analysts, journalists need to hear the call or read a transcript to effectively report on the news offered by managers on the call.
One factor limiting managers' public disclosure of firm news is concern that such information could be used by competitors. The proprietary cost hypothesis has been explored in both theoretical and empirical accounting research (Verrecchia 1983 , Darrough and Stoughton 1990 , Feltham and Xie 1992 , Newman and Sansing 1993 , Hayes and Lundholm 1996 , Berger and Hann 2007 . To the extent that earnings conference calls potentially offer information strategically useful for a firm's competitors, firm competitors are hypothesized to be consumers listening to the call and/or reading a transcript of the call. Similarly, firm disclosures have also been 9 In an informal investigation, Tasker (1998) contacted firms prior to the passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure and was denied access to the earnings conference call for some of those she contacted. 10 Mayew (2008) also finds that some non-analyst participants ask questions. In doing so, their identity becomes known. These include "bankers, institutional investors, and occasionally individuals" (page 642, footnote 16).
hypothesized as a tool to facilitate contracting (e.g. Zimmerman 1986, Holthausen and Watts 2001) . Suppliers and strategic partners who interact and contract with the firm could seek to consume the information in earnings conference calls to enhance their knowledge about the firm.
All these aforementioned constituencies that are hypothesized to listen to earnings conference calls are external entities not employed by the firm. Some evidence also suggests that internal parties may seek to listen to earnings conference calls. For example, Bushee et al. 2003 note that "informal discussions with investor relations officers indicate that employees frequently listen to earnings conference calls and view them as a useful forum for learning about issues facing the firm"(159). In this spirit, a variety of internal or closely connected individuals may also be hypothesized to listen to earnings conference calls including consultants and bankers.
For these different groups that could potentially consume earnings conference calls, it is difficult to make ex-ante predictions about what proportion of these various constituencies might seek to consume earnings conference calls. Moreover, more deeply understanding the nature of information consumption steps beyond prior theoretical and empirical work since many of these relationships have not previously been identified. With this in mind, the analysis of consumption in Section 4 is presented in an ethnographic manner by seeking to describe and interpret this information consumption. In this spirit, this analysis is much in line with the recent call by Gow, Larcker, and Reiss (2015) for greater in-depth descriptive focused research.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Thomson Reuters collected the records used for our analysis by monitoring its client activity on its Streetevents platform. Streetevents is a leading corporate disclosure and archiving product. It is designed for institutional and corporate users who access the database via subscription to one of Thomson Reuters' products. unique non-earnings conference calls for NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ traded firms. 15 In total, over 3.1 million separate requests were made during our sample period for audio and transcript records of these firms' earnings conference calls, guidance calls, product release presentations, analyst calls, and annual meeting broadcasts. In connecting our analysis to the broader research and literature on earnings conference calls, our analysis focuses on earnings conference calls. As described in our data, access requests for earnings conference calls make up the majority of all 11 This figure excludes "live feed" subscribers that redistribute this data within their own proprietary software. 12 Thomson Reuters facilitates live web broadcasts (both, via Streetevents platform and/or on a firm's website), but firms rely on external vendors to facilitate the telephone broadcast of the call (e.g. Intercall, BT Conferencing, ACT Conferencing, etc.). These outside vendors provide the "1-800" number used for the phone conference/broadcast and coordinate the question and answer period with participants. 13 Due to internal processes, staff at Thomson Reuters Investors Relations have access to the identities of buy-side clients, but do not always have access to the identities of other clients using of the product. This availability reflects Thomson Reuters' objective to provide information about buy-side demand to its Investor Relations clients (but not about other consumers' demand of earnings conference calls). 14 The records conclude in December 2012 when NASDAQ purchased the Thomson Reuters Investor Relations unit, which created our original agreement for the records used in this analysis. 15 Streetevents includes data on listed firms from over 90 countries. Our analysis focuses on the subset of users who demanded earnings conference call information from NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX firms. such corporate presentation requests. In particular, during our sample period, nearly 2.6 million, or 81% of the total access requests, were requests for audio broadcasts or transcripts for earnings conference calls.
The 2,828 firms hosting the earnings conference calls in our sample represent 53% of the firms that are publicly traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. With a mean market capitalization of $5.6 billion, our sample firms are somewhat larger than the comparable universe with a mean of $2.8 billion. However, some smaller listed firm which lack a formal IR department and do not have quarterly earnings conference calls naturally skew the population size downwards as compared to our sample which only includes firms that conduct quarterly earnings conference calls. Table 1 , Panel A provides descriptive statistics on the number of unique users seeking access to the earnings conference call in a timely manner. Users may listen to audio broadcasts of the earnings conference calls or they can read the transcripts that Thomson Reuters creates in real-time, i.e. as the earnings conference call progresses. We define timely access as demand for the audio or transcript records of an earnings conference call that occurs on the day of the call (i.e.
either contemporaneously with the broadcast or soon after its completion). Since the audio broadcast and transcript are substitute products for many users (i.e. users may only select one or the other based on their own personal preferences), we also create an aggregate measure that captures users' unique demand for one or both disclosure mediums (i.e. demand for audio, transcript, or audio and transcript). Specifically, we count more than one timely access to records of the same earnings conference call by the same user as a single, i.e. one, access. The advantage of the aggregate measure is it captures the specific interest for each earnings conference call without conflating this demand for different mediums of access (i.e. transcript or audio). In later analysis, we primarily focus on aggregate consumption using this metric.
Using the aggregate measure of demand, on average, there are 27 requests for each earnings conference call as shown in Table 1 Thus, firms often exhibit considerable variation from quarter-to-quarter in the amount of institutional demand for their earnings conference calls.
Our records from Thomson Reuters also permit us to examine the type of user (i.e. the consumer) who sought access to the earnings conference call. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the six types of users classified by Thomson Reuters. The user type designation is determined internally by Thomson Reuters and is based on a user's firm and function. 17 The most prominent consumers of earnings conference call news in our records are buy-side investors (i.e.
institutional investors who purchase equity or debt securities). We find an average of 16 buy-side investors demanding audio or transcript access per event. The second-highest demand is by the 17 For most cases, our records contain the name of the firms that each user works for. However, using Thomson Reuters' classification types offers greater information content since they know the functional role of each individual. For example, while we might know that an individual works for a particular investment bank, this would not allow us to classify the individual as an analyst, trader, or M&A banker. However, Thomson Reuters' internal classification captures these differences in job functionality.
'sell-side', which designates analysts and brokers who typically work for investment banks.
'Corporate' describes institutional clients who do not work in an investment capacity or analyst capacity at other firms. In addition to suppliers and strategic partners, 'corporate' includes users who work in strategy, public relations, and investor relations at competing firms. Corporate users consume earnings conference call news marginally lower than sell-side users in our records.
The final two groups, consultants and media, consume conference call considerably less than others in our records. Consultants include users who are employees of strategic, managerial, or economic consultancies. Media includes journalists who work for either print/online publication or broadcast stations.
Overall, these descriptive statistics suggest that there is significant demand for earnings conference calls by heterogeneous groups of institutional consumers. Beyond the buy-side and sell-side demand that is the focus of much of the academic work on earnings conference calls, our analysis suggests that numerous other groups (i.e. corporate users, consultants, and the media) also significantly consume these events. Understanding the factors associated with this variation in both timely and historical demand is the focus of our analysis in Section 4.
Analysis of Demand for Earnings Conference Call Records
We investigate why the demand for audio and transcript records of earnings conference calls varies across different firms and differs in the type of users. We examine both the determinants for demand and how they vary across different consumers of information. Our analysis begins by examining the timely demand for earnings conference calls. We then examine the historical demand for audio and transcript records of these earnings conference call events, i.e. the demand that occurs at least one day after the earnings conference call takes place. 
Analysis of Timely Demand for Earnings Conference Calls
We explore how three different categories of explanatory variables-those related to the firm, those related to the event, and those under the immediate influence of managementinfluence demand for earnings conference calls. Firm related factors (e.g. market value, trading volume, number of analysts, etc.) tend to be relatively stable over time and not under the direct influence of management. Event level factors (e.g. negative surprise) are related to the information being disclosed by the firm and are largely outside of management's immediate discretion. The third set of factors captures the timing of the release (e.g. evenings, Friday release, conflicts with other events) and has the greatest managerial discretion. 18 Although all explanatory variables are under managerial control in the long-run (e.g. firm strategy influences leverage), by separating them based on managerial discretion, we seek to better understand the relative flexibility management has on influencing consumption. Table 4 displays our regression analysis of timely demand for earnings conference calls on factors hypothesized to explain variation in this demand. All regression specifications are based on OLS and standard errors are double clustered by firm and quarter. We also include quarterly time fixed effects to account for changes in aggregate product usage across our sample period.
Our model explains a considerable amount of the variation in demand for earnings conference calls. For the aggregate model, the R-squared of the model is 76%. Even after removing the Fama-French industry indicators (i.e. 47 indicator variables for the 48 industry groups), the R-squared for model (1) is still 71%. 19 The majority of the explanatory power underlying aggregate earnings conference call consumption is driven by firm related factors. Specifically, 67% of the variation is explained by firm factors (i.e. excluding competing events, after hours/Friday, and surprise). When earnings 18 All explanatory variables are under managerial control in the long-run (e.g. firm strategy influences leverage).
Separating the explanatory variables along these dimensions allows us to understand the relative influence of shortterm managerial decisions on the demand for earnings conference calls. M&A activity could be considered under the immediate discretion of management, however as we are presenting it here, managers are unlikely to directly engage in M&A activity to strategically seek greater or lesser earnings conference call demand. 19 Removing both the Fama French industry indicators and quarterly time fixed effects, we find that the R-squared in Table 4 , Model 1 is 69%. conference call factors are included (e.g. negative surprise return, or large negative surprise), the R-squared rises by less than 1%. When factors under immediate managerial control are included (e.g. competing events, after-hours/Friday), there is a 4% increase in R-squared over the model with only firm factors. Overall, this suggests that much of the variation in earnings conference call demand is outside the immediate control of management.
Looking at the economic and statistical significance of individual explanatory variables, regression (1) of Table 4 indicates that explanatory variables associated with larger and more influential firms, such as market value and the number of analysts, are positively associated with greater consumption. These effects are also economically significant. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the market capitalization from the mean is associated with a nearly 41% increase in the number of aggregate earnings conference call requests. Firms with greater trading volume also experience greater demand.
Information asymmetry arises from differences in information sets held by firm insiders and outsiders. Such asymmetries can be resolved through the consumption of firm-initiated disclosures. We find that firms with greater information asymmetry, as proxied by analyst dispersion, experience greater demand for their earnings conference call records.
Firms with greater institutional ownership as a percentage of total shares outstanding and firms that recently changed their CEO also have greater earnings conference call demand. In particular, a new CEO is associated with a 9% increase in demand. Newly listed firms who conducted their IPO in year prior to the earnings conference call have 12% lower demand on average.
Significant and unexpected informational shocks are hypothesized to attract more demand in an effort to understand the nature of the news. Descriptive evidence (e.g. spike in demand in Figure 2 ) suggests that this arises around significant negative news. In models (2)- (3) of Table 4 , we examine whether a negative surprise leads to greater consumption through several different specifications of negative news shocks. All three specifications show a rise in consumption with larger negative news surprises having the largest economic impact. In particular, earnings conference calls around large negative news surprises have 13% more consumption on average.
We also examine in Table 4 a number of factors under the discretion of management about the timing of the call. Market participants have constraints on the amount of information that they can consume at a given point in time (Simon 1997) . We expect that when there are more earnings conference calls occurring at a particular point in time, the likelihood that any earnings conference call will be consumed will be lower. Consistent with this, we find that the number of competing earnings events is negatively associated with demand for the earnings call. In terms of economic magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in the number of competing earnings conference calls from the median is associated with a 16% decline in number of consumers. Firms that hold their earnings conference calls after-market hours have considerably lower demand than those that hold them earlier in the day. Specifically, after hour calls have 60% lower demand on average. Firms holding their earnings conference calls on Friday also have lower demand.
Firms holding their earnings conference calls after the market close on Friday, beyond the work week for many users, have incrementally lower demand as would be expected.
In summary for Table 4 , a variety of explanatory variables, including firm characteristics, earnings conference call characteristics, and timing variables that are under short-term managerial discretion, influence the amount of consumption of earnings conference calls. In untabulated results, analysis of demand for audio records and analysis of demand for transcript records are largely consistent with results in the aggregate model. While variables in each of these categories are statistically and economically significant, we find that most of the explanatory power arises from firm related factors that are relatively stable in the short run. This suggests that investor relation's effort to significantly increase demand has limited success in the short run. In section 5, we revisit the question about the amount of discretion managers have in influencing demand for earnings conference calls.
In Table 5 , we explore how demand varies across different institutional consumers of earnings conference calls. For brevity, we focus on interpreting the results of the aggregate model in the analysis. Our variables offer considerably more explanatory power for the buy-side, sellside, and corporate groups than either consultants or media. In particular, the R-squared for buyside, sell-side, and corporate groups ranges between 61-77%, whereas the consultants and media R-squared is 15% and 28% respectively. One potential explanation for this difference is that we rely on publicly observable and quantifiable variables to explain variation in demand.
Consultants operate within a firm and journalists, specifically those playing a more investigative role, focus on internal firm dynamics (e.g. individual managers, personnel, etc.).
The results in Table 5 offer evidence that there are several differences in the drivers of demand for the various consumers of earnings conference calls. We find that higher average daily volume is associated with greater demand for all groups, but plays a relatively greater role for the buy-side that needs liquidity to enter/leave investment positions. Information asymmetry in the markets is associated with demand from the buy-side, sell-side, and corporations but no other group. Institutional ownership is positively associated with the buy-side and sell-side as one would expect given their group's objectives, but is negatively associated with corporate and media groups. M&A activity is especially important to corporate groups which help facilitate these transactions and the sell-side/media that report on these activities. Following this, we find that M&A is positively associated with consumption for these groups.
Overall, we find that factors that influence consumption vary both in significance and relative importance across the different types of consumers. These differences reflect the different objectives of the different groups such as the buy-side which focus on investment decisions or the media which focuses on reporting events that garner wider readership. Table 2 suggests that the buy-side is the largest consumer of earnings conference calls.
Analysis of Timely Buy-Side Demand for Earnings Conference Calls
More clearly, Figure 4 Panel A shows that 57% of all earnings conference call demand is from the buy-side. By virtue of this being the largest consumer as well as the consumer that is most closely connected to prior research, we seek to further investigate the nature of buy-side consumption.
The Thomson Reuters records allow us to identify the specific buy-side investors consuming the calls. We match the names of the buy-side institutions with 13F filings data to understand whether these buy-side institutions are security holders of the firms they consume the earnings conference call of and what amount of securities they hold. 20 From the Thomson Reuters data, we also know the type of institutional investor (e.g. hedge fund, value, passive, etc.) and later explore the relationship between the type of institutional investor and earnings conference call demand.
We find that the majority of the buy-side institutions consuming earnings conference calls are not contemporaneous holders of the firm's securities. Specifically, 52% of the buy-side consumers are not holders of the firm's securities at the time they are consuming the earnings conference call (Figure 4, Panel B) . Thus, although the academic literature typically speaks of the investor as someone who currently holds a stake in the firm and uses firm disclosure to monitor his investment, we find that much of the buy-side institutional consumption actually arises from non-holders who may be considering an investment or using this information to fulfil other informational needs (e.g. relationship of this firm vs. a competitor that they do hold a position in). These results support that accounting information serves not only a contracting and monitoring role, but also a screening role for investment decisions.
The proportion of holders vs. non-holders varies significantly across firms and time.
Although the average firm has 52% non-holders on the call, the interquartile range varies from 33% to 67% (Table 6 , Panel A). In Panel B of Table 6 , we seek to understand the determinants of the relative demand by holders and non-holders. In regression (1), we find that larger firms, those with worse stock performance and those hosted on days with more competing events have a lower proportion of non-holders. Consistent with the idea that large negative surprises attract the attention of potential investors, we find in (2) an increase in the proportion of non-holders when firms report a large negative surprise.
One potential concern with models (1) and (2) is that firms with a relatively small number of holders could be skewing results through a small-denominator in the ratio of non-holders to holders. To mitigate this concern we rerun the analysis, restricting it to firms with a least 10 to 25 buy-side institutional holders respectively in models (3) and (4). In doing so, we find that our explanatory power rises from 8% to 37%. The significance of the coefficients remains largely similar, except for analyst dispersion that becomes both positive and statistically significant. Such filings (often because of size threshold). In addition, there are cases in which Thomson does not provide a specific client name for a buy-side client which prevents this matching. a finding is consistent with the idea that greater uncertainty in the market attracts more nonholders to understand the nature of the firm's disclosures.
The composition of holders and non-holders also varies. Panel C of Figure 4 , displays the type of holders and non-holders consuming earnings conference calls. Most notably, hedge funds consist of a much larger proportion of non-holders on calls than holders. One explanation for this finding is that hedge funds are searching for potential investment ideas. Another observation is the lack of passive investors on earnings conference calls. On the one hand, given that passive investors, by nature, do not actively respond to firm disclosures, this ought to be expected. On the other hand, while passive investors only consist of 2% of holders, they constitute a significant portion of the total investment in firms. This suggests that as passive investment rises to a greater proportion of total invested assets, consumption Even for institutional investors that have holdings in the firm, consumption of the earnings conference calls is not certain. As an example, consider the consumption of one large Boston-based institutional investor in a large-capitalization oil and gas refiner. Over the sample period, the investor had, on average, an over $400 million dollar position in the firm. Yet, the investor only consumed the earnings call in approximately 70% of quarters.
To better understand the likelihood of an institutional holder of the firm's stock consuming the earnings conference call, we examine several determinants of demand in to consume disclosures for a particular firm.
In Table 7 , Panel A, we find that hedge funds and venture capitalists are considerably more likely to consistently consume earnings conference calls of the firms they hold investments in. In particular, hedge funds will be on the call 59% of the time on average as compared to growth and value investors (both 47% on average). These differences are also statistically significant (tstat: 30.7 and 24.4 respectively). There are relatively fewer venture capitalists in our sample (i.e. n=78) given the requirement of 13F holding making the validity of consumption by venture capitalists somewhat more conjectural.
In Panel B, model (1) we regress whether a particular holder is on a call against the market value of the firm and the type of institutional investor. Notably, we find that hedge funds investors are more likely to be on the call, but do not find similar trends with other investor groups.
To further explore how the characteristics of the investor contribute to their consumption decisions, we examine how the size of their position contributes to earnings conference call consumption. In models (2)- (4) we look at how the raw size of their holding, the percentage of their position as compared with that of the overall firm, and the relative size of their position compared to others in their portfolio (as measured by all their 13F holdings) contribute to their consumption choices. In all three models, we find that large holdings contribute to greater earnings conference call consumption. In terms of economic magnitude, a one-standard deviation increase in the value of holdings is associated with a 29% increase in the likelihood of being on the call.
Analysis of Historical Demand for Earnings Conference Calls
Individuals can access disclosure in a timely manner when news is released or they can choose to access them at a later time when conducting research on a firm. . We define historical demand as all demand for audio and transcript records of the earnings conference call beginning one day after the day of the earnings conference call. The figure displays the first three months' demand (where the first month only includes historical demand one day after the event) and then quarterly demand until twelve quarters after the earnings conference call. As shown in the figure, demand for the earnings conference call falls over time, but there is still considerable demand even long after the event date. In particular, two thirds of the historical demand is within three months of the earnings conference call. Yet, there is still over 82,000 access requests, or 7% of the historical demand, made over 3 years (i.e. 12 quarters) after the event date. This suggests that market participants not only value public firm disclosures for their timeliness, but also as historical record for understanding the firm.
As shown in Figure 5 , Table A , nearly 50% of the demand is from the buy-side, which is similar to that for timely demand. However, of these buy-side consumers two-thirds (specifically, 67%) comes from non-holders, i.e. investors that do not hold a security in the firm at the time when they consume the firm's earnings conference call. This historical demand for earnings conference calls from non-holders is considerably larger than the timely demand for earnings conference calls from non-holders. As compared with holders, non-holders consuming historical information are more likely to be hedge funds (Panel C, Figure 5 ). This pattern is similar to the one exhibited in the timely demand for earnings conference calls.
Like our analysis of the timely demand for earnings conference calls, we seek to understand the determinants of historical demand. One difference in the specification is that the number of items available to consumers varies over time for each firm. Firms can decide at their own discretion whether and for how long consumers have access to the audio broadcast of earnings conference calls. The audio version is considered property of the firm and therefore Thomson Reuters will remove the audio broadcast when desired by the firm. Usually, when it is removed from a firm's website (if it was made available there) Thomson Reuters will simultaneously remove the audio record from Streetevents. Audio records of the earnings conference calls are publicly accessed, at the firms' bequest, often for as little as one quarter. In other cases, the firm may continue to allow public availability for a year or more. Because we are interested in understanding the determinants of demand, we include an explanatory variable describing the number of audio records available to consumers for a firm in a given quarter. Table 8 investigates the determinants of historical demand. We run the analysis on a quarterly basis where the dependent variable is the number of items demanded (audio or transcript) in a given quarter for a firm. All standard errors are clustered by both firm and quarter.
We utilize similar explanatory variables as in the timely analysis, however we also include an additional variable describing the number of audio records available in a particular quarter.
We find some similarities and differences between the timely demand and the historical demand for earnings conference calls. As in the timely analysis, larger firms, those with more analysts, and greater leverage have more demand. We also find evidence that firms with greater (recent) analyst dispersion have greater demand. This is consistent with the idea that investors use historical data to resolve contemporaneous information asymmetry in the market.
Contemporaneous excess returns are negatively associated with demand for historical earnings conference calls.
We also find, as expected, that firms with more available audio records have greater historical demand for earnings conference calls. On one hand, this is to be expected since demand can only arise when the products are available to consumers. However, firms are given the opportunity to remove the audio broadcast of their earnings conference call within a quarter and we find that the average firm in a given quarter only has one archived earnings conference call available. This suggests that many firms are potentially curtaining demand of their own earnings conference calls.
As might be expected given the relatively greater scholarly attention towards investors and the sell-side, the model explains considerably more variation for the buy-side and sell-side (R-squared between 64-73%) than consultants or the media (R-squared 29% and 20% respectively).
"Hiding" Consumption
Prior literature in both accounting and finance has examined whether managers seek to hide news by disclosing it at inconvenient times for market participants (deHaan et al. 2015 , Doyle and Magilke 2009 , Dellavingna and Pollet 2009 , Patell and Wolfson 1982 . To the extent that managers try to avoid engagement with external parties and/or attempt to limit consumption of difficult conversation, hosting earnings conference calls at inconvenient times may be an effective strategy. By using our records which allow us to examine the consumption of information directly, we are able to investigate if such maneuverers are effective.
We find some evidence suggesting that firms that disclose at inconvenient times do gain lower timely coverage. Table 4 shows that firms that host calls on Friday and after hours have lower coverage. At the same time as shown in Table 4 , when firms disclose bad news, firms actually get more timely demand. The magnitude of this negative news effect does not offset the inconvenient timing impact, thus creating overall lower timely consumption.
However, investors are not forced to consume firm news immediately when it is disclosed by the firm. If a firm hosts an earnings conference call at an inconvenient time, the consumer could simply wait until it is convenient for him to view a recording. For example, a Friday evening disclosure could be consumed Monday morning when the investor is back in the office.
Consistent with this idea, we see that after-hours earnings conference calls gain greater historical demand in Table 8 . This suggests that institutional consumers more frequently postpone information consumption if information is disclosed at an inconvenient time. To better understand the demand for earnings conference calls that are hosted at different times, Table 10 shows a regression of the sum of same day and follow-on consumption on different call times. For the firms disclosing on Friday, the sum of same day and follow-on consumption is on average lower by nearly 4%. Even for firms disclosing a negative surprise, the net effect of Friday disclosure is marginally negative albeit at an economically limited magnitude.
Firms disclosing after hours had significantly lower timely demand in Table 4 . However, when viewed in conjunction with the additional demand in the coming days, firms disclosing after hours actually have greater consumption. Specifically, firms disclosing after hours are associated with 8% greater total consumption. Thus, firms disclosing after hours actually have greater consumption.
Viewing this evidence in light of the negative timely demand for after hour calls in Table   4 , suggests that hosting calls at inconvenient times is not an entirely successful strategy to avoid information consumption.
Conclusion and Future Opportunities
Our analysis offers insight into the types of institutional users that demand corporate earnings conference calls. In this way, our work complements several recent pieces of research (Drake et al 2014 , Drake et al 2015 , Bozanic et al 2014 that explain the demand for mandatory SEC filings by examining the EDGAR database. 21 In contrast to these examinations that focus on the demand for mandatory disclosure filings by largely individual investors, we explore institutional demand for earnings conference calls, a form of voluntary firm-initiated disclosure, and find that much of the demand is from non-buy-side investors. Our results suggest that researchers have the opportunity to consider an expansive view of the potential consumers when thinking about the demand for firm-initiated news.
The evidence that significant numbers of non-market participants consume these disclosures raises a number of questions for future research. While much research has been done on the incremental information content of earnings conference calls to investors, we understand little about how these other constituencies utilize the information disclosed during earnings conference calls. In addition, it would be compelling to understand the relationship between these other constituencies and the firm. For example, are most consultants consuming earnings calls currently engaged by the sample firm? Consultants may be consuming these calls to understand prospective clients or to understand the competition of clients with whom they are currently engaged. A better understanding of the full use of such firm-initiated disclosures would offer a more complete understanding of how they are being utilized by both market and non-market participants.
Our analysis focuses on the institutional consumers of earnings conference calls.
However, there is also a related question of the specific non-institutional users who consume earnings conference calls. Records of these events could help shine additional light on the specific types of individual investors that seek to consume firm-initiated voluntary disclosures. Since
Regulation Fair Disclosure was motivated to facilitate greater accessibility of events like earnings conference calls, examining such records could offer evidence potentially validating this regulatory change. Moreover, such an investigation is likely to shed light on other groups (e.g. regulators) that also seek to consume this news.
We also find that institutional investors, even those with large holdings, irregularly consume earnings conference calls. In periods that they do not consume calls, the question is how they satisfy their information needs. Do they rely on information intermediaries (e.g. analysts, media) instead of consuming the call on their own? Do these investors simply rely on information signals from the market (e.g. major swings in stock price) to determine how much attention they ought to pay to different investments in their portfolio? Additional data would help illuminate how these investors are making their portfolio decisions.
Finally, we find very little consumption of calls by passive investors like indexers. This is not surprising given that they, by definition, are not making allocation decisions based on firm news. At the same time, as additional funds flow into indexers as a "best practice" investment strategy (i.e. low cost, avoids chasing returns), it suggests that there will be potentially less investment engaged in actively monitoring firm news. Despite some public criticism around their fees and incentives, it is intriguing to find that the funds that are typically the most richly rewarded for performance (e.g. hedge funds and VC) are also those that are most engaged with consuming firm news in a timely manner.
Figure 1 -Timely Demand for Earnings Calls
Figure 1, Panel A shows the distribution of timely, aggregate demand for 27,392 earnings conference calls. Timely, aggregate demand for an earnings conference call is measured on the day when the earnings conference call takes place and represents the total number of consumers that request audio or transcript records of the earnings conference call on that day. The sample period starts in December 2009 and ends in December 2012. Repeated access requests by the same consumer for the same earnings conference call count only once. Figure 1 , Panel B shows for 2,828 firms the average timely, aggregate demand for the firm's earnings conference calls during the sample period. This ratio is calculated as the sum of timely aggregate demand for all earnings conference calls of a given firm divided by the number of earnings conference calls for the given firm. Table 1 -Timely Demand   Table 1 , Panel A provides summary statistics for timely demand for 27,392 earnings conference calls. Timely demand for an earnings conference call is measured on the day when the earnings conference call takes place and represents the total number of consumers that request audio or transcript records of the earnings conference call on that day. The sample period starts in December 2009 and ends in December 2012. Timely, aggregate demand counts repeated access requests through the same or through different mediums (i.e. audio vs. transcript) by the same consumer for the same earnings conference call only once. Timely, audio demand only counts requests for audio records. Timely, transcript demand only counts requests for transcript records. Timely, audio demand and timely, transcript demand count repeated access requests through the same medium by the same consumer for the same earnings conference call only once. Figure 1 , Panel B provides summary statistics for the average timely, aggregate demand for 2,828 firm's earnings conference calls during the sample period. Table 8 examines the determinants of historical demand for earnings conference calls using 29,056 firm-fiscal quarters. Historical demand is calculated for each firm-fiscal quarter as the sum of all audio and transcript requests during the firm-fiscal quarter minus timely demand during the firm-fiscal quarter. Within a firm-fiscal quarter, repeated access requests by the same consumer for the same earnings conference call through the same or through different mediums (i.e. audio vs. transcript) are counted only once. 'All' includes audio and transcript requests from all user types. Regressions by type of user only include the audio and transcript requests from the respective type of user. Explanatory variables are described in Table 3 . All standard errors are double-clustered by firm and quarter. ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
(1) Table 10 examines the determinants of the sum of same day and follow-on demand as defined in Table 9 . 'All' represents, per earnings conference call, the sum of same day and follow-on demand across all consumer types. Regressions by type of user only include the sum of same day and follow-on demand from the respective user group. Explanatory variables are described in Table 3 . All standard errors are double-clustered by firm and quarter. ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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